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Abstract
Existential social psychology studies show that awareness of one’s eventual death profoundly influences human cognition
and behaviour by inducing defensive reactions against end-of-life related anxiety. Much less is known about the impact of
reminders of mortality on brain activity. Therefore we explored whether reminders of mortality influence subjective ratings
of intensity and threat of auditory and painful thermal stimuli and the associated electroencephalographic activity.
Moreover, we explored whether personality and demographics modulate psychophysical and neural changes related to
mortality salience (MS). Following MS induction, a specific increase in ratings of intensity and threat was found for both
nociceptive and auditory stimuli. While MS did not have any specific effect on nociceptive and auditory evoked potentials,
larger amplitude of theta oscillatory activity related to thermal nociceptive activity was found after thoughts of death were
induced. MS thus exerted a top-down modulation on theta electroencephalographic oscillatory amplitude, specifically for
brain activity triggered by painful thermal stimuli. This effect was higher in participants reporting higher threat perception,
suggesting that inducing a death-related mind-set may have an influence on body-defence related somatosensory
representations.
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Introduction
"[…] Death, the most dreaded of evils, is therefore of no
concern to us; for while we exist death is not present, and
when death is present we no longer exist. Epicurus (Letter to
Menoeceus, 43–44).
Awareness of unavoidable death has a powerful impact on
cognition and human behaviour [1]. The terror management
theory (TMT) has shown that pondering on one’s own mortality
promotes stereotypical thinking as well as a defensive attitude
towards one’s own values and beliefs [2]. An important asset of the
TMT is the hypothesis that cultural and personality factors may
act as mediators of the anxiogenic effects caused by the awareness
of death. In particular, the hypothesis that increased self-esteem
makes an individual less prone to anxiety or thoughts about death
has received much experimental support (e.g. [3–6]). Other
authors have shown how priming thoughts about one’s death
induces negative emotions (e.g. anxiety), provokes avoidance of
self-focused states [7], and leads individuals high in neuroticism to
avoid physical sensations, including pleasurable ones [8].
Although there is general agreement that thoughts of death
significantly affect cognition and human behaviour, only a few
studies have investigated how thoughts of death influence cortical
representation of sensory information. Noteworthy here are studies
that investigated the effect of death-content accessibility on bold
signal or event-related potentials (ERPs) amplitudes [9–11] and on
its interaction with neural processes linked to social-affective
categorization of facial expressions [12], as well as with
observation of others’ pain [13]. More specifically, using fMRI,
Quirin et al. [10] reported that accessibility to thoughts of death
induced higher activation of structures usually associated with
emotion regulation, such as the amygdala and the anterior
cingulate cortex (ACC). More recently, Klackl et al. [11] reported
larger late positive potential amplitudes associated with death-
related words, a finding that may be interpreted as indexing
preferential mortality salience effects on emotion regulation.
Nevertheless, these results are in contrast with evidence of
decreased ACC and insular activity for death-related words in
the context of a linguistic Stroop task [9]. Surprisingly, although a
relationship between mortality salience effects and implicit
anxiogenic mechanisms has been acknowledged in previous
studies, there is currently no evidence linking the effects of
mortality salience to representation of threatening sensory
information within the central nervous system.
Here, we sought to determine whether thoughts of death can
influence perceptual ratings and cortical representations associated
to threatening sensory stimuli. Combining a paired stimulation
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 November 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 11 | e112324
Received May 9, 2014; Accepted October 7, 2014; Published November 11, 2014
design with electroencephalography (EEG), we explored the effects
of mortality salience on ERPs and oscillatory theta activity elicited
by pairs (S1–S2) of laser thermal painful stimuli, before and after
the induction of a cognitive mind-set (i.e., a mental disposition).
Pairs of auditory stimuli, matched in subjective intensity with the
painful radiant thermal stimuli, were used to explore the effects on
perception and neural representation of non-painful stimuli.
Paired stimulation was conceived as a minimalist approach to
induce a repetition suppression effect (e.g. [14]). Indeed, most of
studies investigating short-term habituation of EEG responses
evoked by radiant heat stimulation reported a dramatic reduction
of response magnitude to repeated identical stimuli already at the
level of the second stimulus, with no further decrement in response
to the following stimuli (e.g. [15,16]). The second stimulus of each
pair was therefore designed as a test stimulus and conceived as a
minimal measure of basic sensitization/habituation processes.
We hypothesized that mortality salience interferes with phasic
cortical responses to repeated threatening sensory stimuli by
exerting a top-down allocation of attentional resources regardless
of sensory stimulation salience that leads to stimulus detection and
attentional orientation processes [17], and thus impairing the
reduction of response amplitude observed to repeated stimulation
at short fixed inter-stimulus interval (e.g. [18,19]).
Overall, the present design enabled us to isolate the effects of
mortality salience from i) the sole salience or novelty of the sensory
stimulation, ii) the variability of the neural responses prior to the
mind-set induction, and thus iii) disclose cognitive/emotional top-
down modulations of cortical representation of threat contingent
upon accessibility to death thoughts.
Methods
Ethics statement
Participants gave written informed consent and were debriefed
at the end of the experiment. All experimental procedures were
approved by the Fondazione Santa Lucia local ethics committee
and were in accordance with the standards of the Declaration of
Helsinki.
Participants
Twenty right-handed healthy participants (12 females) aged
between 21 and 33 (mean 6 SD, 24.564.4) participated in the
study. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were
naı¨ve as to the purpose of the experiment. None of the participants
had a history of neurological or psychiatric illnesses or conditions
that could potentially interfere with pain sensitivity (e.g. drug
intake or skin diseases).
Personality measures
Preliminary screening and selection of volunteers was conducted
using self-report measures of personality traits that could
potentially interfere with the effect of the applied mind-set
induction on perception and cortical arousal. The Beck Depres-
sion Inventory (BDI) [20] and the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory
(STAI) [21] were administered to obtain an index of individual
psychopathological symptoms of depression and anxiety, respec-
tively. Participants who scored higher than 17 on the BDI and
higher or lower than two standard deviations (SD) on the STAI
were not allowed to enter the study [22]. These cut-off scores
determined the preliminary exclusion of two participants.
Nociceptive and auditory stimulation
The nociceptive heat stimuli were pulses generated by an
infrared neodymium yttrium aluminium perovskite (Nd:YAP) laser
with a wavelength of 1.34 mm (Electronical Engineering, Florence,
Italy). Duration of the laser pulses was 5 ms. These pulses
selectively and directly activate the Ad and C-fiber nociceptive
terminals located in the superficial layers of the skin [23]_EN-
REF_4. The laser beam was transmitted via an optic fiber and its
diameter was set at approximately 7 mm (<38 mm2) by focusing
lenses. Laser pulses were delivered on a square area (565 cm)
defined on the left hand dorsum prior to the beginning of the
experimental session. He-Ne laser indicated the area to be
stimulated. To prevent increases in baseline skin temperature
and fatigue or sensitization of the nociceptors, the position of the
laser beam was changed after each pulse. An infrared thermom-
eter (precision 60.3uC) was used to measure the temperature of
the stimulated skin area before and during the experiment (group-
average intensity of 34.260.7uC). Temperature fluctuations never
exceeded 0.8 SDuC within participants.
During a familiarization and calibration procedure on the
quality of the sensation associated with radiant heat stimuli,
participants were instructed to define the intensity of the sensation
using both a numerical rating scale (NRS) and a visual-analogue
scale (VAS). For both of these methods, intensity was defined as
how strong the sensation was. Participants were instructed to
verbally rate intensity of painful stimuli according to the NRS
from not intense or barely intense (0–10) to low intense (21–40),
moderately intense (41–60), highly intense (61–80) and extremely
intense (81–100). Participants were allowed to give decimal ratings
over the entire numerical scale. The energy of the stimulus was
adjusted using a staircase procedure. The procedure required one
increase (increasing) series and one decrease (decreasing) series in
steps of 0.5 Joules (J), followed by an increase (increasing) series in
steps of 0.25 J until the target intensity of the nociceptive-related
sensation was reported (i.e. pricking/burning sensation; [24]).
Lastly, energies within 0.5 J below and above the energy eliciting
the pricking/burning sensation were delivered to test the reliability
of the intensity ratings. Eventually, all the calibrated stimuli were
defined as painful by the participants and perceived as threatening.
As our objective was to establish a perceptual similarity between
laser heat- and auditory-related percepts, once the target intensity
was found and the corresponding laser energy calibrated (group-
average intensity of 4.560.4 J), participants were required to self-
adjust the intensity of the auditory stimulation to match the
intensity of the nociceptive stimulus using the same criteria as the
NRS for the nociceptive stimuli (see [19,25] for a detailed
description). This procedure was applied to create a threatening
experience similar to the one induced by somatosensory nocicep-
tive stimuli, by asking the participants to focus on the most simple
aspect of somatosensory nociceptive sensation: its magnitude. By
matching the two types of sensory stimuli according to their
magnitude we obtained a match of the salience of sensory
stimulation and reduced the complexity of a matching procedure
based on cognitive/affective aspects of the stimuli (e.g. unpleas-
antness), while obtaining a comparable level of threat for auditory
stimuli during the experiment. Auditory stimuli were short tones of
800 Hz frequency (50 ms; 5 ms as the rising and falling time of the
tone) emitted by a loudspeaker placed in front of the participants’
left hand (<50 cm from the participant and <50 cm from the
midline). Once auditory intensity was calibrated (group-average
intensity of 81.863.6 dB; measured at the subject’s left ear),
participants underwent a brief learning procedure during which
the NRS anchors were transferred onto the experimental VAS. If
a significant discrepancy was noticed between NRS ratings during
calibration and VAS judgments during learning, the calibration
procedure was repeated.
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During this procedure the participants received paired stimuli
(at a fixed interval of 1 s) to accurately match the two modalities
according to the requirements of the experimental design.
EEG recording
EEG recordings were obtained from sixty tin electrodes
(Electro-cap International - ECI) placed according to the positions
of the 10–20 International System. Three surface electrodes were
positioned for the vertical, horizontal electro-oculography (EOG)
recording below the right eye and at the right and left ocular
canthi and one electrode at the left mastoid for electromyography
recording (EMG). The reference was on the nose and the ground
at AFz. Electrode impedance was kept below 5 kV. The EEG
signal was amplified and digitized at 1000 Hz.
Design and experimental procedure
Participants underwent two separate experimental sessions (on
two different days, same time of day). In both sessions, participants
were submitted to four recording blocks (Fig. 1, top panel). The
first two blocks had no cognitive manipulation (condition pre) and
served as a baseline condition to compare with the modulatory
effects of the following cognitive manipulation (condition post).
After the first two blocks, participants were randomly assigned to
one of two mind-set conditions (cf. [26,27]). The order in which
the mind-sets were administered in the two experimental sessions
was counterbalanced across participants (Fig. 1, top panel, centre).
Following the typical TMT paradigm, participants were asked to
write down their thoughts in a short questionnaire consisting of
two open questions that focused either on the possibility of their
own death (’Mortality Salience’-MS) or the contingency of having
failed an important exam (’Exam Salience’-ES). The ES mind-set
induction was meant to trigger a negative valence state similar to
that induced by the MS condition; thus, it controlled for the
specific effects of mortality salience on human behaviour [27,28].
Importantly, ES was selected as the control condition after a
preliminary pilot survey in which several different mind-sets used
in the experimental TMT literature were compared along
different dimensions in a sample of 100 respondents. ES was
judged as the condition most similar to MS (thus, not significantly
different from it) across several parameters, e.g. arousal, valence,
threat, puzzlement (see Material S1). Participants had 5 min to
answer the questions, after which they were exposed to a
distraction period. This was based on the notion that to observe
the implicit effects associated with mortality salience the individual
should be distracted from the salience of this mental content [29].
The distraction period lasted 15 min during which participants
completed the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS,
[30]) and the State Anxiety Inventory (STAI-Y, [31]), and were
asked to play with a brain-shaped Rubik’s cube before undergoing
the EEG again (20 minutes in total). Administration of the
questionnaires was repeated immediately after the last two blocks
to check for carry-over effects caused by the mind-set induction on
participants’ self-reported state mood and anxiety.
Participants were comfortably seated in a temperature-con-
trolled room (25 Cu) with their hands resting on a table, <40 cm
from the body midline. A wooden frame blocked the sight of their
left arm and the laser device. Participants were asked to relax and
fixate the center of the computer screen placed in front of them.
The background of the computer screen was black throughout the
experiment. Each block lasted between 7 and 12 min and there
was a 5 min pause between blocks 1 and 2 and blocks 3 and 4
(Fig. 1, top panel). In each block, 20 pairs of stimuli (S1–S2, a
pair), 10 per each sensory modality, were delivered in a pseudo-
random fashion (no more than three consecutive pairs belonging
to the same modality) or near the left hand dorsum at a constant
inter-stimulus interval (ISI) of 1 s. Thus, each participant was
subjected to 80 trials (40 pairs and 80 single stimuli per modality)
in each experimental session. Between each laser pulse of a
nociceptive pair, the laser beam was manually displaced by at least
1 cm along a proximal-distal line on the hand dorsum [15]. The
direction of this displacement was balanced in each block (10 pairs
in the proximal direction and 10 pairs in the distal direction). A
proximal-distal spatial displacement was used to minimize the role
of variations in thickness and innervations of the irradiated skin
[32] in affecting the strength of the nociceptive input.
Each pair formed a single experimental trial (Fig. 1, bottom
panel) in which S1 was considered the conditioning stimulus and
S2, the test stimulus. The timing of each trial was as follows; a
white fixation cross on the computer screen (3 s) was followed by a
yellow fixation cross that alerted the participants to relax all their
muscles and avoid eye movements before the impending
stimulation (6–12 s). Nociceptive and auditory stimuli composing
the pair were delivered at 1 s inter-stimulus intervals and jittered
during this time window. After the delivery of each pair of stimuli
a yellow fixation cross appeared on the screen (3 s) to signal
participants to wait to report their sensations. Participants were
asked to rate both intensity and threat for each stimulus in the pair
(i.e., provide two ratings for S1 and two for S2) using the right
hand to move a mouse and position a pointer on a 101 point
electronic visual-analogue scale (VAS) on the screen, within 15 s
from its appearance. At the bottom of this scale, zero was
represented by the label ‘‘not intense at all’’ for the intensity
assessment and ‘‘not threatening at all’’ for the threat assessment.
At the top of this scale, 100 was represented by the label
‘‘extremely intense’’ or ‘‘extremely threatening’’. Intensity and
threat ratings were asked in a pseudo-random order (repeated no
more than three times within each block). Threat was defined
during the brief learning procedure and was meant to distinguish
the sensory-discriminative dimension associated with the magni-
tude of the sensation from a cognitive-affective dimension related
to interpretation of its homeostatic meaning. Threat ratings were
measuring participants’ interpretations of the stimuli as indicating
imminent danger, warning of an incoming unpleasant state.
According to the trial timeline, the inter-trial interval thus ranged
between 24 and 30 s. During pre and post blocks, the group’s
average skin temperature was 34.260.7uC and 34.360.9uC,
respectively.
Data analysis
State mood and anxiety. Scores obtained on the PANAS
and STAI scales were analyzed using the Wilcoxon matched pairs
test to compare scores obtained immediately after MS and ES
inductions as well as at the end of the experiment. The level of
significance was set at P,0.05.
Psychophysics. The calibration procedure was aimed at
improving participants’ ability to detail their sensations and
concurrently counteract the ordinal nature of the VAS scale by
increasing within and between subjects reliability [33]. This
approach allowed for the normal distribution of intensity ratings in
all conditions across the two different sensory modalities. Indeed,
participants could be clustered in three different ranges of
perceived intensity: a lower bound, corresponding to a sensation
of low intensity (21–40; mean and SD = 34.764.1; n = 4), a
middle range corresponding to moderate intensity (41–60;
51.766.4; n = 10) and an upper bound corresponding to high
intensity (61–80; 71.167.5; n = 6).
The factor Time (two levels: pre and post) was split in order to
feed an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) with a continuous
Reminders of Mortality and Cortical Sensory Representation
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predictor pre and a categorical predictor Mind-set (two levels: MS
and ES) of the response pattern observed in the post mind-set
induction measures (i.e., the dependent variables). ANCOVA was
carried out separately on ratings obtained in each sensory modality
(auditory and nociceptive). Analysis of covariance is the most
powerful statistical approach for experiments in which subjects are
assigned randomly to treatment groups, regardless of whether
there is a bias due to the initial measurement, because it allows
reducing within group error variance (i.e. it strongly reduces
between-subject variability from the treatment comparison) [34–
37]. Finally, we computed post-pre change scores for both MS and
ES conditions; they were compared using t-tests for paired
dependent samples. The level of significance was set at P,0.05.
Partial eta squared (pg2) as measures of effect size of significant
main effects and interactions are reported.
EEG preprocessing. EEG data were preprocessed with
Vision Analyzer software (Brain Products, v. 1.05). They were
first downsampled to 250 Hz, transformed to the average
reference [38], DC detrended and band-pass filtered from 0.5 to
30 Hz. Data were then segmented into epochs using a time
window ranging from 1 s before the first stimulus (S1) to 1 s after
the second stimulus (S2) of each pair (total epoch duration: 3 s).
Epoched data were further processed using EEGLAB (v. 12.x;
[39]) and Letswave 5 (http://nocions.webnode.com/). EOG and
EMG artifacts were subtracted using independent component
analysis (ICA; [40]).
EEG Analysis in the time domain. Epochs belonging to the
same experimental condition (ES pre, ES post, MS pre, MS post)
were averaged and time-locked to the onset of the first stimulus of
each pair. This procedure yielded eight average waveforms, one
for each experimental condition and sensory modality (nociceptive
and auditory respectively). For each individual average waveform,
the relative peak amplitude of the late nociceptive and auditory
evoked potentials (NEPs and AEPs respectively) elicited by S2 was
extracted (mean of 10 ms around the peak). For NEPs N1, the
mean of the activity in the range of the observed topography was
extracted (130–180 ms). The NEP N1 wave was measured at the
temporal and central electrodes contralateral to the stimulated side
(T8 and C4), referenced to Fz (see [41,42]). It was defined as the
negative deflection preceding the N2 wave, which appears as a
positive deflection in this montage. The N2 and P2 waves were
measured at the vertex (Cz) referenced to the common average.
The N2 wave was defined as the most negative deflection after
stimulus onset. The P2 wave was defined as the most positive
deflection after stimulus onset. For AEPs, N1 and P2 waves were
measured at the vertex (Cz) referenced to the common average.
The N1 wave was defined as the most negative deflection after
stimulus onset. The P2 wave was defined as the most positive
deflection after stimulus onset.
ANCOVA was carried out separately on the extracted S2 NEP
and AEP amplitudes. Then, whole-waveform t-tests (i.e. the entire
EEG signal in a given epoch) were performed to assess point-by-
point amplitude differences within each mind-set (pre vs. post) and
the differences between the two mind-sets during pre and post
induction (MS vs. ES) on the S2 evoked activity. The threshold for
statistical significance was set at P,0.05. Furthermore, differences
in amplitude intervals were considered as significant only when
they lasted at least 10 ms, a temporal cluster used to account for
multiple comparisons. The maximal t value (signed) in each
relevant time interval is reported. These analyses allowed testing
the relevant differences within (pre-post increase vs. decrease in
amplitude) and between (increase vs. decrease in amplitude within
MS or ES) conditions. The finding of a difference in ERPs
amplitude between pre and post, regardless of the mind-set
induction, points to an unspecific mind-set effect on repetition
suppression. Conversely, the finding of a difference during post-
induction trials only when there was no difference during
Figure 1. Experimental design. EEG activity and subjective ratings of intensity and threat of sensory stimulation were collected in two separate
experimental sessions during which participants underwent a ’Mortality Salience’ (MS) or an ’Exam Salience’ (ES) mind-set induction (top panel,
central). The order of MS and ES was counter-balanced across participants. ERPs elicited by either nociceptive somatosensory stimuli delivered to the
hand dorsum (top panel, red) or by auditory stimuli delivered in the same area (top panel, blue) were recorded in four blocks. The first two blocks
were free from cognitive manipulation (condition ’Pre’, top left) whereas the following two blocks (condition ’Post’, top right) were preceded by the
mind-set induction (5 min) and a distraction period (20 min) during which participants completed the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule and the
State Anxiety Inventory. In each block, 20 pairs of stimuli (S1–S2, a pair), 10 per each sensory modality, were delivered in a pseudorandom order. The
stimuli composing a pair were separated by 1 s inter-stimulus interval. Each pair established a single trial which started with a fixation cross on the
screen (3 sec), followed by a yellow fixation cross (6–13 sec) in which the pair was jittered (bottom panel). Three seconds after receiving each pair of
stimuli, participants were required to rate (on a 101-point electronic visual-analogue scale) the intensity and threat of each stimulus in the pair (thus
providing two ratings for S1 and two for S2 within a 15 sec time window). This procedure allowed determining whether any modulation was exerted
by the mind-set induction on the cortical responses and perception associated with nociceptive and auditory stimuli.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0112324.g001
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pre-induction trials suggests a specific effect of mind-set on
repetition suppression.
EEG Analysis in the time-frequency domain. Time-
frequency representations (TFRs) were computed using a Morlet
wavelet in which the initial spread of the Gaussian envelope was
set at 0.15 and the central frequency of the wavelet at 3 Hz. The
transform expressed the oscillation amplitude as a function of time
and frequency, regardless of its phase [43]. Averaging these
estimates across trials discloses both phase-locked and non-phase-
locked modulations of signal amplitude. Across-trial averaging of
these time–frequency representations produced a spectrogram of
the average EEG oscillation amplitude as a function of time and
frequency. For each estimated frequency, results were displayed as
an event-related percentage (ER%) increase or decrease in
oscillation amplitude relative to a pre-stimulus reference interval
(20.6 to 20.2 s before the onset of S1), according to the following
formula: ERt,f % = [At,f - Rf]/Rf, where At,f is the signal
amplitude at a given time t and at a given frequency f, and Rf is
the signal amplitude averaged within the reference interval [44].
Recent studies confirmed that the theta and gamma frequency
bands (e.g. [45,46]) reflect aspecific and specific information
related to pain perception. Here we focused on the theta frequency
range (3–8 Hz). Thus, one time-frequency region of interest
(ROIs) was defined in the spectrograms obtained at Cz, where the
main spectral events maximally express their magnitude. The
time-frequency limits of the time-frequency ROI (3–8 Hz and
100–500 ms) were defined according to previous studies (e.g.
[47,48]). Within the time-frequency ROI, ER% amplitudes were
extracted by computing the mean of the 10% pixels displaying the
highest activity in the given time-frequency range. This ‘‘top 10%’’
summary measure reflects the higher ER% values within each
window of interest to reduce the noise introduced by including
near-to-zero values. This approach, which was successfully used to
analyze both EEG [15] and fMRI data [49,50], proved suitable to
disclose condition-specific effects [19,51–53]. For point-by-point t-
tests, the same data analysis approach implemented in the time
domain was used in the time-frequency domain; the only
exception was the temporal cluster chosen for significance:
amplitude intervals were considered as significant only when they
lasted more than 20 ms.
Additional analyses. Gender, age, measures of mood and
anxiety as well as ratings of intensity and threat were used as
categorical or continuous covariates in separate ANCOVAs in
which, together with pre mind-set activity, their contribution to the
significant differences observed between MS and ES summary
measures was tested.
In addition, observed differences were further assessed by testing
the moderating effect of an amplitude response profile (ARP) in
each individual. This was at variance with the use of the sole
regressor pre for S2 activity, as the ARP was calculated as the
difference of S1–S2 activity in pre blocks. Specifically, participants
were split into low and high amplitude suppressors (lows, highs)
according to the median value of the mean activity recorded in the
pre mind-set induction blocks. Lows and highs, classified according
to a median split procedure, were considered as two levels of a
categorical predictor (Suppressors), which entered ANCOVA with
the continuous regressor pre, the categorical predictor Mind-set
(two levels: MS and ES) and S2 peak amplitudes as the dependent
variable. All the additional analyses were computed only on the
neural activities affected by Mindset according to the main
ANCOVA analyses.
Results
State mood and anxiety
Pre and post state mood and anxiety score distributions were not
significantly different between MS and ES conditions immediately
after mind-set induction (PANAS positive: Z= 0.59, P= 0.55;
PANAS negative: Z= 1.54, P= 0.12; State anxiety: Z= 1.54,
P= 0.12) or at the end of the experimental session (PANAS
positive: Z= 0.67, P= 0.50; PANAS negative: Z= 0.12, P= 0.91;
State anxiety: Z= 0.35, P= 0.72).
Thus, there was no difference in aware feelings of mood or
anxiety between the two different mind-sets, which suggests a
similar activation of proximal defenses [54].
Nociceptive intensity and threat
All the stimuli were perceived as painful by participants. The
ANCOVA on intensity and threat ratings at S2 revealed that the
covariate pre was significant for the analysis of intensity and threat
(F(1, 37) = 410.33, P,0.001; pg2 = 0.92 and F(1, 37) = 638.78,
P,0.01; pg2 = 0.94, respectively). When adjusting for the effect of
the ratings obtained in the pre blocks, a significant main effect of
Mind-set was observed in intensity and threat ratings in the post
blocks (F(1, 37) = 9.92, P,0.01; pg2 = 0.21 and F(1, 37) = 11.88,
P,0.01; pg2 = 0.24, respectively). This effect was accounted for
by higher ratings of intensity and threat in MS trials than in ES
trials, as confirmed by the paired t-tests performed on post - pre
change scores (t(19) = 3.93, P,0.01, and t(19) = 4.37, P,0.001
respectively) (Fig. 2, left panel). Importantly, when controlling for
the effect of the three ranges of perceived intensity (21–40; 41–60;
61–80), the ANCOVA showed neither a main effect (F(2,
33) = 1.07, P= 0.38) nor its interaction with the factor Mind-set
(F(2, 33) = 0.34, P= 0.71), thus suggesting that neither the range of
intensity alone nor its combination with the experimental
conditions explained the observed effects.
Auditory intensity and threat
All auditory stimuli were detected by participants during the
experiment. The ANCOVA on intensity and threat ratings at S2
revealed that the covariate pre was significant for the analysis of
intensity and threat (F(1, 37) = 224.22, P,0.001; pg2 = 0.86 and
F(1, 37) = 676.22, P,0.001; pg2 = 0.95, respectively). When
adjusting for the effect of the ratings obtained in the pre blocks,
no significant main effect of Mind-set was observed in intensity
ratings (F(1, 37) = 0.93, P= 0.34), but a significant effect was
observed in judgments of threat (F(1, 37) = 6.21, P= 0.02;
pg2 = 0.14). This effect was accounted for by higher ratings of
threat in MS trials than ES trials, as confirmed by the paired t-tests
performed on post-pre change scores, in which differences
associated with the judgment of threat reached significance
(t(19) = 4.37, P,0.001); the higher relative increase of intensity
following MS was not significant (t(19) = 1.47, P= 0.15) (Fig. 2,
right panel).
Nociceptive evoked potentials
Grand average waveforms and global field power (GFP) of
nociceptive evoked potentials (NEPs) are displayed in Fig. 3.
Nociceptive stimuli delivered before (Fig. 3; left panel) and after
(Fig. 3; right panel) mind-set induction elicited maximal N2 and
P2 waves at the scalp vertex (electrode Cz) and N1 activity
corresponding to a lower amplitude topography contralateral to
the stimulated body limb.
At Cz, the t-tests performed on S2-ERPs revealed no difference
between MS and ES mind-sets on pre and post respectively
(t19 =21.40; P= 0.45; t19 =22.37; P= 0.25). However, the
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within mind-set t-test revealed a significant difference between pre
and post mind-set induction activity during both MS (t19 = 3.35;
P= 0.005) and ES (t19 = 3.77; P= 0.009) sessions, which was
accounted for by lower amplitudes in the N2 wave range after
both MS and ES induction with respect to the pre mind-set
induction. Importantly though, the ANCOVA on N2 and P2 peak
amplitudes confirmed that once pre was regressed from post no
effect of mind-set could be detected (N2: F(1, 37) = 0.20, P= 0.66;
P2: F(1, 37) = 0.62, P= 0.15, respectively). In both cases, there was
an effect of the covariate pre (F(1, 37) = 46.99, P,0.001;
pg2 = 0.56, and F(1, 37) = 26.76, P,0.001; pg2 = 0.42), suggest-
ing that the N2 wave amplitude reduction observed in post was
likely due to a general effect of habituation.
At C4, the t-tests performed on S2-ERPs revealed no difference
between MS and ES mind-sets in the pre and post conditions
respectively (t19 = 2.20; P= 0.28; t19 =22.06; P= 0.40). Similar-
ly, at T8 the t-tests performed on S2-ERPs revealed no difference
between MS and ES mind-sets in the pre and post condition
respectively (t19 =21.85; P= 0.40; t19 =20.64; P= 0.33). Fur-
thermore, the within mind-set t-test also revealed no significant
Figure 2. Scatterplots of mindset-induced changes (Post-Pre) in rating intensity and threat of S2 for both nociceptive and auditory
stimuli. The x axis shows each participants’ ratings as a function of increased range of intensity and threat. The corresponding average ratings of
intensity and threat are displayed on the y axis. Negative and positive values indicate lower and higher ratings following mind-set induction.
Individual data were fitted by a linear function. An increase of both intensity and threat was observed during the MS condition, especially in the
nociceptive modality (left panel).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0112324.g002
Reminders of Mortality and Cortical Sensory Representation
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 November 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 11 | e112324
difference between pre and post at C4 (ES: t19 = 1.40; P= 0.36;
MS: t19 =20.32; P= 0.46) or T8 (ES: t19 =20.004; P= 0.60;
MS: t19 =21.19; P= 0.50). ANCOVA confirmed no effect in the
early N1 peak amplitudes, at either C4 (F(1, 37) = 0.26, P= 0.61)
or T8 F(1, 37) = 0.09, P= 0.52. The covariate pre was significant
at both C4 (F(1, 37) = 44.65, P,0.001; pg2 = 0.55) and T8 (F(1,
37) = 64.90, P,0.001; pg2 = 0.64).
Analysis of the N2 amplitude differences as a function of the
amplitude response profile (ARP) revealed that there was no
significant interaction between ARP and type of Mind-set (F(1,
35) = 2.31, P= 0.14); however, there was a significant main effect
of the ARP (F(1, 35) = 8.08, P,0.01), which was explained by
lower amplitudes in highs than lows. This finding likely explains
why differences in N2 amplitudes were found only during within
mind-set t-tests and not between mind-sets t-tests and ANCOVA.
This result also suggests the differences found in the N2 amplitudes
were not specific to the influence of MS or ES mind-sets but partly
driven by between-subject differences in inherent neural habitu-
ation/dishabituation profiles.
Auditory evoked potentials
Grand average waveforms and global field power (GFP) of
auditory evoked potentials (AEPs) are displayed in Fig. 4. Auditory
stimuli delivered before (Fig. 4; left panel) and after (Fig. 4; right
panel) mind-set induction elicited N1 and P2 waves that were
maximal at the scalp vertex (electrode Cz). At Cz, the t-tests
performed on S2-ERPs revealed no difference between MS and
ES mind-sets in pre and post respectively (t19 =22.46; P= 0.23;
t19 =23.02; P= 0.17). In addition, no significant difference
between pre and post was revealed by the within mind-set t-test
during the MS (t19 = 3.21; P= 0.11) or ES (t19 = 3.92; P= 0.10)
sessions. However, similar to the results obtained with the
nociceptive ERPs, the ANCOVA on N1 and P2 peak amplitudes
confirmed no significant effect of Mind-set (F(1, 37) = 2.13,
P= 0.15 and F(1, 37) = 2.17, P= 0.15, respectively). In both cases,
there was an effect of the covariate pre (F(1, 37) = 86.50, P,0.001;
pg2 = 0.70, and F(1, 37) = 68.02, P,0.001; pg2 = 0.80).
Analysis of the N1 amplitude differences as a function of ARP
revealed no significant interaction between behaving as lows or
highs and type of Mind-set induction (F(1, 35) = 1.00, P= 0.32)
and no significant main effect of the ARP (F(1, 35) = 0.71,
P= 0.40). This control analysis showed that the lack of influence of
Mind-set induction on the auditory N1 was not related to
individual variability in response amplitude.
Nociceptive oscillatory activity
Grand average spectrograms of nociceptive-related brain
activity (as measured at Cz referenced to the common average)
both before (Fig. 5, panel A, top) and after (Fig. 5, panel A,
bottom) mind-set induction. At Cz, the t-tests performed on the
S2-ER% revealed no difference in pre mind-set activity (t19 = 0.63;
P= 0.53; Fig. 5, top right graph) but highlighted a significant
difference in the post mind-set activity at the level of the theta band
ROI (t19 = 2.55; P= 0.02), which was accounted for by a higher
ER% magnitude after MS than ES induction (23369 vs. 20866)
(Fig. 5, panel B, bottom). This difference peaked at 262 ms (range:
239–290 ms) and at 5 Hz (3.3–6.8 Hz). The within mind-set t-test
revealed no significant difference between pre and post during the
MS condition (t19 =20.96; P= 0.35; Fig. 5, panel A, right), but
there was a trend to a significant reduction of S2 ER% magnitude
(237610 vs. 20866) following ES induction (t19 =22.11;
P= 0.05; Fig. 6, panel A, left). The ANCOVA on ER% S2
magnitude revealed a significant effect of mind-set (F(1, 37) = 4.70,
P= 0.03; pg2 = 0.11). Moreover, regressing out the pre mind-set
activity had no significant effect on the model, i.e., it did not help
address the post mind-set differences (F(1, 37) = 0.33, P= 0.57). In
other words, the ANCOVA confirmed the difference evidenced by
the t-tests, which was entirely explained by higher ER%
magnitude in the theta band following the MS than the ES
mind-set (ER% least squares means, MS vs. ES, 23468 vs.
20768; Fig. 5, panel B, bottom).
Analysis of ER% magnitude differences as a function of ARP
revealed no significant interaction between behaving as lows or
highs and type of Mind-set (F(1, 37) = 0.37, P= 0.55) nor a
significant main effect of the ARP (F(1, 37) = 0.60, P= 0.44). At
the same time, the introduction of this factor in the ANCOVA
model did not affect the significance of the factor Mind-set (F(1,
37) = 4.72, P= 0.03; pg2 = 0.12). This finding suggests that the
Figure 3. Nociceptive evoked potentials (NEPs). Group-level average scalp topographies of NEPs (upper and lower panel) and global field
power (GFP; lower panel) elicited by stimulation of the left hand dorsum before and after mind-set induction (left and right panel respectively).
Butterfly plots show ERPs from 60 channels superimposed in 20 participants. NEPs were elicited by pairs of nociceptive stimuli delivered at a fixed 1 s
ISI. Representative scalp topographies of each NEP during ES (black) and MS (red) conditions are shown in the insets. Note the amplitude reduction
between S1- and S2-related activity.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0112324.g003
Reminders of Mortality and Cortical Sensory Representation
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 7 November 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 11 | e112324
Figure 4. Auditory evoked potentials (AEPs). Group-level averages, scalp topographies, and global field power (GFP) of AEPs elicited by
stimulation of the left hand dorsum before and after mindset induction (upper and lower panel respectively). Butterfly plots show ERPs from 60
channels superimposed in 20 participants. ERPs were elicited by pairs of nociceptive stimuli delivered at a fixed 1 s ISI. Representative scalp
topographies of each AEP component during ES (black) and MS (red) conditions are shown in the insets. Note the significant amplitude reduction
between S1- and S2-related activity.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0112324.g004
Figure 5. Effect of the two mind-sets induction on the nociceptive S2-ER% oscillatory activity at Cz. Grand average time-frequency
representation of nociceptive-related oscillatory activity (as measured at Cz) both before (panel A, top) and after (panel A, bottom) mind-set
induction. The a priori identified theta time-frequency ROI was used to extract the ‘‘top 10%’’ of the signal amplitude increase (ER%) relative to the
pre-stimulus interval (20.6 to 20.2 sec before onset of S1). Note the decrease of signal magnitude at S2 following ES mind-set induction (panel A,
bottom left). No similar decrease occurred after MS mind-set induction (panel A, bottom right). Panel B: the y axes show single subject and group
means of oscillatory amplitude (ER%) before (top) and after (bottom) mind-set induction. Higher ER% magnitude after MS than ES mind-set induction
(23369 vs. 20866 ER%) (bottom) was detected both by t-test and ANCOVA. ANCOVA revealed that this difference was entirely explained by the
modulatory effect of MS on S2 even when regressing out Pre activity. The difference peaked at 262 ms (range: 239–290 ms) and 5 Hz (3.3–6.8 Hz).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0112324.g005
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genuine modulation of oscillatory ER% magnitude was due to the
induction of a cognitive mind-set and that the specific effect of
mortality salience was reliable regardless of the inherent neural
habituation/dishabituation profile of each individual.
Auditory oscillatory activity
Grand average spectrograms of auditory-related brain activity
(as measured at Cz referenced to the common average) both
before (Fig. 6; panel A, top) and after (Fig. 6; panel A, bottom)
mind-set induction. At Cz, the t-tests performed on S2-ER%
revealed no difference in either pre mind-set (t19 = 1.55; P= 0.14)
or post mind-set activity (t19 = 0.46; P= 0.65) at the level of the
theta band ROI (Fig. 6; panel A, top and bottom, respectively).
The within mind-set t-test also revealed no significant difference in
either the ES (t19 =20.10; P= 0.92) or MS condition (t19 = 0.73;
P= 0.47) (Fig. 6, panel A, left and right, respectively). The
ANCOVA on ER% S2 magnitude confirmed the lack of effect of
Mind-set (F(1, 37) = 0.38, P= 0.54) and no significant contribution
of the covariate pre to the model variability (F(1, 37) = 1.05,
P= 0.31).
Analysis of ER% magnitude differences as a function of the
ARP revealed no significant interaction between behaving as lows
or highs and type of Mind-set induction (F(1, 35) = 0.72, P= 0.40)
or a significant main effect of the ARP (F(1, 35) = 1.55, P= 0.22).
This control analysis showed that the lack of influence of mind-set
induction on the auditory theta ER% was not related to individual
variability in response profile.
Covariance of oscillatory activity with subjective ratings
and demographics
ANCOVA revealed that, following the induction of mortality
salience, the ER% magnitude increased concomitantly with the
increase in ratings of threat. That is, the higher the rating of threat
attributed to the S2 nociceptive stimulus, the higher the theta
ER% magnitude (Fig. 7, left). Moreover, the ER% magnitude
increase co-varied with the participants’ age, that is, the older the
participant, the greater the increase in magnitude regardless of the
type of mind-set applied (Fig. 7, right). In addition there was no
co-variation of the nociceptive related ER% magnitude with state
mood and anxiety measures (lowest F= 1.55; lowest P= 0.22).
Discussion
Here, we provide evidence that reminders of one’s own
mortality have a preferential effect on perceptual judgments
(Fig. 2) as well as on cortical spectral activity (Fig. 5) associated
with the processing of somatosensory nociceptive input. Further-
more, the effect observed on cortical activity covaried significantly
with participants’ ratings of threat and their age (Fig. 7). More
specifically, we found that the effect of Mind-set on intensity
ratings was significant for nociceptive stimuli (Fig. 2, top left) but
not for auditory stimuli (Fig. 2, top right). Conversely, the increase
in threat ratings following reminders of mortality affected
individual’s judgments of both nociceptive and auditory stimuli
(Fig. 2, bottom left and right). The analyses of ERPs revealed a
reduction of the negativity following mind-set induction. However,
such decrement became insignificant when the S2 amplitudes
Figure 6. There was no effect of mind-set induction on the auditory S2-ER% oscillatory activity at Cz. Grand average time-frequency
representation of nociceptive-related oscillatory activity (as measured at Cz) both before (panel A, top) and after (panel A, bottom) mind-set
induction. The a priori identified theta time-frequency ROI was used to extract the ‘‘top 10%’’ of signal amplitude increase (ER%) relative to the pre-
stimulus interval (20.6 to 20.2 sec before the onset of S1). Note the decrease of signal magnitude at S2 following mind-set inductions (panel A,
bottom left and right). Panel B: the y axes show single subject and group means of oscillatory amplitude (ER%) before (top) and after (bottom) mind-
set inductions.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0112324.g006
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recorded before the mind-set induction were regressed out.
Furthermore, the effect of Mind-set observed on the nociceptive
evoked N2 became insignificant when the variability associated
with individual differences in response amplitude was regressed
out, thus suggesting that the amplitude reduction was due to
habituation and inter-individual variations in response amplitude.
Importantly, the analyses of oscillatory ER% magnitude
provided a statistical difference between the two mind-sets. We
found higher nociceptive-related theta activity elicited by S2
following reminders of death than following reminders of a failed
exam (Fig. 5, panels A and B); no such effect was found in the
auditory theta activity (Fig. 6, panels A and B). Note that
regressing out the S2 ER% observed before the mind-set induction
did not explain the post-induction difference, which was thus
entirely explained by higher ER% magnitude in the theta band
following mortality salience but not exam salience (Fig. 5, panel B,
bottom). Interestingly, this top-down impairment of the expected
magnitude suppression at S2 covaried with the participants’
perception of threat, that is, the higher the rating of threat
attributed to the nociceptive stimulus, the higher the theta ER%
magnitude (Fig. 7, left). Moreover, the ER% magnitude increase
covaried with the participants’ age, that is, the older the
participant, the greater the increase in magnitude regardless of
the type of mind-set applied (Fig. 7, right).
The interaction between mortality salience and brain
representation of threatening somatosensory input
Here we explored the selective effect of inducing a mortality
salience mind-set on the perception of nociceptive stimuli and on
the magnitude of evoked potentials and oscillatory EEG activity
associated with them. We focused on evoked vertex potentials (N1,
N2, and P2 NEPs; N1 and P2 AEPs) and oscillatory responses in
the theta band (3–8 Hz). The paired stimulation design served to
test whether a significant top-down modulation (indexed by S2-
related responses) associated with the contextual relevance of
accessibility to death thoughts could revert the amplitude
suppression phenomenon associated with the reduced salience of
the repeated sensory input.
The effects reported here can be distinguished as mind-set
specific (i.e., the modulation of nociceptive theta ER%) vs. mind-
set unspecific (i.e., the modulation of NEP N2 and AEP N1). The
phase-locked N1, N2, and P2 nociceptive-evoked potentials
(especially the vertex N2-P2 waves) include low frequencies in
the delta/theta band (1–8 Hz) [15,47], and particularly in the
delta range [47]. Nevertheless, recent studies reported that theta
(e.g., [46]) and even alpha spectral activity [45,55] may contribute
to the above components. Thus, there are at least three reasons
why the TF representation in the theta band may not entirely
account for variations in the magnitude of LEPs. First, different
parameters of TF signal decomposition may bring about subtle
different results in terms of involved frequencies. Second, and
independent of the first reason, the latency and magnitude of the
TF decomposition cannot be related only to the contribution of
each one of these responses in isolation nor captures solely the
phase-locked information (although most of the information
represented in the theta band is phase-locked). Third, all sensory
evoked responses are contributed by activities in the range of delta
and alpha frequencies and not only by the theta frequency band
[56]. As we detailed above, the theta oscillatory activity reported in
the present study can be considered as a general representation of
the late vertex activity evoked in the time domain which only
partially represents each specific time-locked nociceptive evoked
potential. It has been speculated that activity in the theta range
may serve as a biomarker of pain processing [55,57] and more
generally as an index of abnormal neural processing in psychiatric
and neurological diseases [58].
It is possible that, as theta activity can be particularly sensitive to
the intra- and inter-individual short-term variations of salient
sensory information perceived as threatening, and ultimately
ensuing in the experience of pain (e.g., [46]), it could be sensitive
to the unaware involuntary top-down cognitive/emotional mod-
ulation exerted by reminders of mortality. However, according to
the TMT theory, such modulation would not be mediated by self-
Figure 7. Covariation of nociceptive ER% with subjective ratings (left) and demographics (right). In each scatterplot both MS (red) and
ES (blue) conditions are represented with their respective fits. The scatterplot at the left shows that the higher the rating of threat attributed to
nociceptive S2, the higher the magnitude of theta activity. More importantly, the different slopes indicate that the increase in the ER% was higher
after MS than ES mind-set induction. Similarly, the scatterplot on the right shows that the higher the participant’s age the higher the magnitude of
theta activity. Note in this case the nearly parallel relationship between the two slopes, which indicates that the effect of age modulated the two
mindsets equally.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0112324.g007
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reported negative mood or anxiety. Yet, as correctly argued by
Tritt et al. in a recent insightful review [59], this notion cannot rely
on a statistical null effect (namely, the absence of differences in
ratings of mood between mind-sets). In addition, the idea that
defense mechanisms triggered by mortality salience are based on a
specific death–related "potential for anxiety" mechanism rather
than on a more general anxiety mechanism did not receive enough
evidence yet. Therefore, a more biologically plausible explanation
should be advocated that is grounded on brain mechanisms
evolutionarily developed to resolve uncertainty in the environment
(and so avoid unexpected events) [60], basically mediated by a
general anxiety system [59].
Despite such theoretical debate, our current results provide
evidence in favor of the TMT by showing that the effect of
mortality salience on nociceptive theta ER% was not associated
with positive and negative affect or anxiety because the self-
reported measures did not explain the variance associated with the
mind-set effect and did not covary with the observed effects (cf.
Results section). Nevertheless, the fact that following mortality
salience the ER% magnitude increased concomitantly with the
increase in ratings of threat (Fig. 7, left) suggests that the
motivational state associated to the reminders of mortality
increased arousal and vigilance in the participants. Tritt et al.
[59] proposed that biological underpinnings of mortality salience
might not be unique but rather a particular expression of a more
general set of biological responses to uncertainty. In this respect,
the findings obtained in our preliminary survey (see Material S1)
support the notion that self-reported measures of general anxiety
and emotions may be strongly influenced by mind-sets different
from reminders of mortality (e.g. the possibility of becoming
paralyzed or being abandoned). These authors suggest that a
brain-based anxiety system exists, which is responsible for the
biological processes subtending mortality salience and, more
generally, threat defense phenomena. This would also explain
the specific sensitivity of brain responses to somatosensory
threatening stimuli to the top-down modulation exerted by
mortality salience. The fact that no mediation of self-reported
anxiety on the neural measures was found in the present study, by
no means implies that future studies will be unable to identify
automatic, implicit and unconscious anxiety mediation of mortal-
ity salience effects on the neural correlates of bodily threat.
Methodological and theoretical considerations
Several aspects of the methods applied here are worth
discussion to foster future research in this area. We implemented
a calibration procedure in which the intensity of auditory
stimulation was adjusted to match the intensity of the laser
stimulation. The self-adjusting calibration approach is reported in
detail in previous publications [19,25]. In short, participants were
asked to abstain from a separate assessment of auditory sensation
and, instead, attempt to equalize their perception of the auditory
stimulus in relation to the nociceptive one. However, it must be
noted that, despite the attempt to match the perceptual magnitude
between the two modalities, the auditory stimulation could not be
fully comparable with somatosensory heat stimulation (for it did
likely not activate mechano-nociceptors in the ear). In spite of the
fact that auditory stimuli were salient and perceived as threaten-
ing, they did not induce pain. Thus, whether the effects observed
in this study would be replicated using a nociceptive and/or
painful stimulus in a sensory modality other than somatosensory
remains an open question. However, it should be noted that it may
not be possible to induce pain by selectively activating nociceptors
in non-somatosensory modalities (i.e. auditory, visual, and
olfactory). Despite this criticality, the finding that participants
attributed some degree of threat to auditory stimuli, and that this
was modulated by reminders of mortality, reflects the success of
the perceptual calibration procedure (Fig. 2), thus substantiating
the methodological sensitivity of the control sensory stimulation
used. Nevertheless, our results cannot provide conclusive modality
specific effects, and different sensory stimuli acquiring homeostatic
significance/behavioural relevance for the body could exert
similar effects at the level of brain responses. In addition, the
effect size of the significant difference in the theta oscillatory
activity was small (pg2 = 0.11), thus suggesting that this finding
should be considered as a preliminary observation in need of
replication.
The specificity and sensitivity of the effects of mortality salience
on theta activity concomitant to somatosensory threatening stimuli
is supported by the effects associated with the induction of a failed
exam mind-set, a control condition which was suggested to be
most comparable to mortality salience across several cognitive/
affective dimensions (see Material S1). The biological underpin-
nings of mortality salience may be not mapped on a specific neural
system but rather on a set of areas representing the neural
reactivity to uncertainty [59]. It should be emphasized that death
was not rated as the worst option in several of the measured
circumstances. Indeed, self-reported ratings of negativity, alarm,
threat, and significance were higher for other mind-sets (e.g.
becoming paralyzed or being abandoned) than for reminders of
mortality.
Another important aspect of the methodology adopted in the
present study was the use of a within subject design, which
contrasts with classical social psychology studies [27,28]. To the
best of our knowledge only two neuroscientific studies [10,11]
applied a within- rather than a between-subjects experimental
design. Between-subjects designs do not take into account
individual differences in responsiveness to the mind-set induction,
hence the participation of an individual in repeated tests in each
experimental condition increases the statistical power and
precision of the study, as well as it reduces the amount of
participants required in a study.
Although the age range of the sample recruited in the present
study was limited, an interaction between the cognitive mind-set
inductions and the age of the participants (namely, the older the
participant the larger the effects of the mind-sets) is consistent with
the differential effect of mortality salience across different ages
[27,61]. Yet, future studies with a more representative age group
will determine whether the age-related differences reported here
are actually a result of developmental changes over the life span
and whether the effect may be specific to a cognitive mind-set
specifically associated to reminders of mortality or whether it
would be an unspecific effect, as observed in the current study.
To conclude, our findings support the hypothesis that reminders
of mortality have a modulatory effect on the perception of
threatening somatosensory stimuli and their associated neural
responses. Importantly, this effect becomes stronger the more the
stimuli are judged as threatening, suggesting an influence of death-
related thoughts on somatosensory representation.
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